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Paul Krugman 
Picture Mom, Dad, and the kids in an upper-middle-class Asian family 
in  10 years’ time: After loading up with cash at the corner Citibank, 
they drive off to Walmart and fill the trunk of their Ford with the likes 
of Fritos and Snickers. On the way  home, they stop at the American- 
owned Cineplex to catch the latest Disney movie, paying with their Visa 
card. In the evening, after putting the kids to bed, Mom and Dad argue 
furiously about whether to invest in a Fidelity mutual fund or in a life 
insurance policy issued by American International Group. (New York 
Times, 1 February 1998) 
OK, it’s a bit silly, and was meant to be. When the New  York Times 
painted this portrait in early 1998, it was a deliberate caricature. Nonethe- 
less, it drew attention to a real phenomenon: The Asian financial crisis, 
although marked by  massive flight of short-term capital and large-scale 
sell-offs of foreign equity holdings, has at the same time been accompanied 
by  a wave of inward direct investment. This inward investment to some 
extent reflects policy changes, as Asian governments, under pressure from 
the International  Monetary  Fund (IMF) and in  any case desperate for 
cash, have dropped old policies unfavorable to foreign ownership. But it 
also reflects the perception of many multinational firms that they can now 
buy Asian companies and assets at fire-sale prices. 
A similar, though probably less marked, boom in inward direct invest- 
ment took place in Latin America, especially Mexico, during 1995; so we 
can, at least preliminarily, regard the nexus of crises, fire sales, and surging 
Paul Krugman is  the  Ford International Professor of  Economics at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search. 
43 44  Paul Krugman 
foreign direct  investment  (FDI) as an empirical regularity. As  such,  it 
raises several interesting questions: 
1.  Why should direct investment surge at a time when foreign capital in 
general is fleeing a country? What does this tell us about the nature of 
such crises? 
2.  Is the transfer  of control that is associated with foreign ownership 
appropriate under these circumstances? That is, loosely speaking, are for- 
eign corporations taking over control of domestic enterprises because they 
have  special competence,  and can therefore run them better, or simply 
because they have cash and the locals do not? 
3.  Does the fire sale of domestic firms and their assets represent a bur- 
den to the afflicted countries, over and above the cost of the crisis itself? 
(This question is likely to be raised with considerable force if the national- 
istic backlash in Asia, which is clearly present although so far still surpris- 
ingly muted, becomes a more important aspect of the situation. “We must 
realize the great danger facing our country,” Malaysia’s Prime Minister 
Mahathir has already warned. “If we  are not careful we  will be recolo- 
nized.”) Or is the ability to sell firms to foreigners, on the contrary, a miti- 
gating factor in the crisis? 
These are all, I believe, relatively novel questions. As already noted, the 
phenomenon of “fire-sale FDI” was indeed present in earlier crises; but it 
has become far more prominent this time because of the scale of the Asian 
crisis, the extraordinary collapse of asset values, and-perhaps  most im- 
portant-the  abruptness of our reevaluation of an economic and corpo- 
rate system !hat  before the crisis was widely regarded as superior to that 
of the West. Moreover, the Asian crisis-to  a far greater extent than the 
Latin crisis of 1995-has  led to the creation of a set of “new wave” crisis 
models that seem better suited to the discussion of direct investment than 
the traditional currency crisis literature. 
This paper, then, has three purposes. The first is simply to draw atten- 
tion to the phenomenon of fire-sale FDI and to stimulate discussion of 
what is likely to become a major economic and political issue in the corn- 
ing years. The second is to indicate, in a preliminary way, how this phe- 
nomenon might emerge in the context of alternative crisis models. The 
third is to examine the welfare implications of crisis-induced sales of do- 
mestic assets to foreign firms, and in particular to ask how those implica- 
tions depend on our diagnosis of the crisis itself. 
2.1  The Fire Sale: What Is the Evidence? 
At the time of this writing, hard statistical evidence of a surge in FDI 
into Asia was not yet  available. However, even a quick search of news 
databases turns up a plethora  of anecdotes about foreign purchases of Fire-Sale FDI  45 
Asian firms-actual,  impending, or potential-especially  in South Korea. 
Titles of recent articles in the financial press include “Korean Companies 
Are Looking Ripe to Foreign Buyers” (New York Times, 27 December 
1997), “Some U.S. Companies See Fire Sale in South Korean Crisis” (Los 
Angeles Times, 25 January 1998), “Some Companies Jump into Asia’s Fire 
Sale with  Both  Feet” (ouch!) (Chicago Tribune, 18 January  1998), and 
‘‘While Some Count Their Losses in Asia, Coca-Cola’s Chairman Sees 
Opportunity” (Wall Street Journal,  6 February  1998). The latter article 
described Coke’s buyout of its Korean bottling partner, as well as its in- 
creased stake in its Thai operations. Other reported deals in prospect or 
under negotiation included the following: 
General Motors was reported in January 1998 to be considering buying 
stakes in South Korean manufacturers of both automobiles and parts, 
while  Ford was reported  to be planning to increase its stake in  Kia 
Motors. 
Seoul Bank and Korea First Bank were supposedly likely to be auctioned 
off to foreign bidders. 
Procter & Gamble purchased a majority share of Ssanyong Paper Co., a 
producer of sanitary napkins, diapers, and kitchen towels. 
Royal Dutch Shell was negotiating to buy Hanwha Group’s oil refining 
company; the group had already sold its half of a joint venture in chemi- 
cals to the German company BASE 
My favorite: “Michael Jackson is getting into the action, negotiating to ac- 
quire a ski resort from its owner, a bankrupt Korean underwear maker.” 
In addition to being entertaining, lists like this one serve to demonstrate 
an important point about the new surge of acquisitions: It is very widely 
spread across industries. It is one thing for US. financial service compa- 
nies to be buying up Asian counterparts; this is  an area in  which the 
United States has long been perceived to hold a substantial technological 
and managerial advantage, and has indeed been a focus of U.S. demands 
for liberalized trade and investment for precisely that reason. Until  re- 
cently, however, few would have argued that U.S. firms held a comparable 
advantage across the board, in areas as diverse as auto manufacturing and 
paper products. This indicates clearly that the source of the investment 
surge must lie in a change in conditions that affect all industries, namely 
the financial situation. 
In a proximate sense there is, of course, no mystery about that change 
in conditions. In  1997 South Korea’s currency lost half its value against 
the dollar, and its stock market lost 40 percent of its value in domestic 
currency. Thus the price of South Korean corporations to foreign buyers 
in effect fell by 70 percent, in some cases producing what appeared to be 
spectacular bargains (Korean Air, with a fleet of more than one hundred 
jets,  had  a  market  capitalization at the  end of  1997 of  $240  million, 46  Paul Krugman 
roughly the price of  two Boeing 747s-although  any buyer would also 
have acquired its $5 billion debt). Moreover, heavily indebted corpora- 
tions, facing a credit crunch, were desperate to sell off factories and sub- 
sidiaries to raise cash. 
The more difficult question, however, is  to explain why  the prices of 
assets should have fallen so much, so suddenly-which  comes down to 
the question of how to explain the crisis itself. As we  will see, our assess- 
ment of the apparent surge in FDI depends in some ways on our model 
of the crisis. 
The next step is therefore to set out two alternative (though not neces- 
sarily mutually exclusive) models of the Asian financial crisis; once we have 
these models under our belt we can try to see what they say about FDI. 
2.2  Modeling the Crisis I: Moral Hazard and Asset Deflation 
One thing that quickly became apparent in the Asian crisis was that the 
depth and scope of the calamity put it outside the range of what could be 
explained by traditional speculative-attack models-whether  of the “first- 
generation” type developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Krugman 
1979; Flood and Garber 1984) or the “second-generation’’ type that be- 
came  popular  after  the  European  currency  attacks of  1992  (Obstfeld 
1994). A heavy majority of  the theoretical efforts to make sense of  the 
crisis focus on the role of financial intermediaries; indeed, many of us be- 
lieve that as a first cut it may actually be useful to ignore exchange rates and 
monetary aspects entirely, focusing on the demand for and pricing of real 
assets. 
Within this agreed-on focus on the financial system, much of the recent 
discussion of  the  Asian  crisis  has  clustered around  an  approach  that 
stresses the role  of  implicit guarantees  in producing  moral hazard,  of 
moral hazard in producing overborrowing, and then of the implosion of 
the unsound  financial system thus created, producing a self-reinforcing 
collapse of asset values. The moral hazard-overborrowing  view was em- 
phasized in a series of initially underappreciated papers by McKinnon and 
Pill (especially McKinnon and Pill  1996). My own simplified exposition 
of how moral hazard can create overpricing of assets, and how an endo- 
genous policy regime-in  which implicit guarantees are maintained only 
as long as they do not prove too expensive-can  cause self-fulfilling crisis 
(Krugman 1998a, 1998b), seems for the moment at least to have provided 
the seed around which opinion has crystallized. As we  will see, there are 
other possible models that are by no means out of the running. However, 
it seems appropriate  to begin with this canonical-model-of-the-minute, 
since it does offer one way to make sense of fire-sale FDI. 
Here is how the story goes: The problem began with financial intermedi- 
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government guarantee, but which were essentially unregulated and there- 
fore subject to severe moral hazard problems. The excessive risky lending 
of these institutions created inflation-not  of goods but of asset prices. 
The overpricing of assets was sustained in part by  a sort of circular pro- 
cess, in which the proliferation of risky lending drove up the prices of risky 
assets, making the financial condition of the intermediaries seem sounder 
than it was. 
And then the bubble burst. The mechanism of crisis, I suggest, involved 
that same circular process in reverse: Falling asset prices made the insol- 
vency of intermediaries visible, forcing them to cease operations, leading 
to further asset deflation. This circularity can explain both the remarkable 
severity of the crisis and the apparent vulnerability of the Asian economies 
to self-fulfilling crisis, which in turn helps us understand the phenomenon 
of contagion between economies with few visible economic links. 
The story can be illustrated using a highly simplified example, in which 
there exists a class of owners of financial intermediaries (“ministers’ neph- 
ews”) who are able to borrow money at the safe interest rate-because 
lenders perceive them as being backed by an implicit government guaran- 
tee-and  invest that money in risky assets. For the sake of simplicity, the 
moral hazard involved in this situation is pushed to an extreme by assum- 
ing that (1) the owners of intermediaries are not obliged to put any of their 
own capital at risk, and (2) there are many ministers’ nephews competing 
to buy risky assets. 
In such a worst-case scenario for moral hazard, the owner of an inter- 
mediary will view investing in an asset as profitable if there is any state of 
nature in whichathat  asset yields a return greater than the safe interest rate. 
At the same time, competition among intermediaries will  eliminate any 
economic profits. The result must therefore be that the prices of assets are 
driven to their “Pangloss values”: what they would be worth based not on 
the expected outcome but on what would happen if we lived in the best of 
all possible worlds. 
To see the implications of this setup, consider first a one-stage game in 
which intermediaries initially compete to buy an asset with uncertain fu- 
ture payoff-call  it land-and  then learn what that payoff is. In particular, 
consider land that may yield a present value of future rent of either 100 
(with probability 1/3) or 25 (with probability 2/3). In the absence of moral 
hazard, risk-neutral investors would be willing to pay a price of 50, the 
expected value of the land. In the extreme moral hazard regime we  have 
described, however, each minister’s nephew will realize a profit in the fa- 
vorable state of nature as long as the price is less than 100, and will simply 
walk away from the intermediary if the state of nature is unfavorable. So 
competition among the nephews will drive the price to its Pangloss value 
of 100. 
Next consider a two-stage game. In period  1 land is bought. In period 48  Paul Krugman 
2 initial rents are revealed and land may be resold. Finally, in period 3, a 
second round of rents are revealed. It simplifies matters, without changing 
the substance, if we  suppose both that rents are identically independently 
distributed (iid) (specifically 25 with probability 2/3, 100 with probability 
1/3) and that the safe interest rate is zero. 
In an undistorted  economy we  can solve backward for the price. The 
expected rent in period 3, and therefore the price of land purchased at the 
end of period 2, is 50. The expected return on land purchased in period  1 
is therefore the expected rent in period 2 (50) plus the expected price at 
which it can be sold (also 50), for a first-period price of 100. This is also, 
of course, the total expected rent over the two periods. (In this example, 
the price of land declines over time, from 100 to 50, even in the undistorted 
case. This is merely an artifact of the finite horizon and should simply be 
regarded as a baseline.) 
Now suppose that intermediaries are in a position to borrow with guar- 
antees. Again working backward, at the end of period 2 they will be willing 
to pay the Pangloss value of third-period rent, 100. In period  1 they will 
be willing to pay the most they could hope to realize from a piece of land: 
the Pangloss rent in period 2 plus the Pangloss price of land at the end of 
that period. So the price of land with intermediation will be 200 in period 
1  -again,  twice the undistorted price. 
Our next step is to allow for the possibility of changes in the financial 
regime. Let us continue to focus on our three-period economy, with ran- 
dom rents on land in periods 2 and 3. And let us also continue to assume 
that in the first period competition among intermediaries with guaranteed 
liabilities causes asset prices to be determined by  Pangloss  rather than 
expected returns. However, let us now introduce the possibility that this 
regime may not last-that  liabilities carried over from period 2 to period 
3 might not be guaranteed. 
As a first step, let us simply posit that the regime change is exogenous, 
that from the point of view of investors there is simply some probability p 
that the government will credibly announce during period two that hence- 
forth creditors of  intermediaries are on their own. (Perhaps this reflects 
the election of a reformist government that is no longer prepared to toler- 
ate “crony capitalism”; or perhaps the end of moral hazard is imposed by 
the IMF.) 
Again, we work backward, and consider the price of land in the second 
period. If liabilities of intermediaries are not guaranteed, then nobody will 
lend to them (the moral hazard will remain, but its burden would now fall 
on investors rather than on the government). So intermediation will col- 
lapse and the price of land will reflect only its expected return of 50. On 
the other hand, if intermediaries are guaranteed, the price will still be 100. 
What about the price of land in the first period? Investors now face two 
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period will be high or low, and they do not know whether the price of land 
in the second period will reflect expected values or Pangloss values. As 
long as there is competition among intermediaries in the first period, how- 
ever, the price of land will once again be driven to a level that reflects the 
most favorable possible outcome: rents of 100 and a price of 100. So even 
though this is  now a multiperiod world in which everyone knows that 
disintermediation and a decline in asset prices is possible, current asset 
prices are still set as if that possibility does not exist. 
Finally, let us ask what happens when the change in regime is endoge- 
nous. In reality, of course, throughout Asia’s arc of crisis there has indeed 
been a major change in financial regime. Finance companies have been 
closed; banks have been forced to curtail risky lending at best and close 
their doors at worst. Even if the IMF  were not insisting on financial house- 
cleaning as a condition for aid, the days of cheerful implicit guarantees 
and easy lending for risky investment are clearly over for some time to 
come. But what provoked this change of regime? Not an exogenous change 
in economic philosophy. Rather, financial intermediaries have been cur- 
tailed precisely because they were seen to have lost a lot of money. 
This suggests that a more or less realistic way to model the determina- 
tion of implicit guarantees is to suppose that they are available only until 
they have had to be honored (or more generally until honoring them has 
turned out to be sufficiently expensive-the  criterion used in Krugman 
1998b). In the context of our three-period example, this criterion can be 
stated alternatively as the proposition that creditors of financial intermedi- 
aries will be bailed out precisely once. 
To see what this means, first suppose that rents in period 2 are disap- 
pointing-25,  not 100. Given the structure of our model, in the absence 
of intermediaries this should have no effect on the price of land at the end 
of the second period, since it does not change the probability distribution 
of future rents. But a less-than-panglossian  rent in period 2 means that 
creditors of intermediaries need to be bailed out in that period, and there- 
fore that future creditors can no longer expect the same. So the intermedi- 
aries collapse, and the price of land drops from 100 to the expected rent 
of 50. 
Notice that this means that there is a magnification effect on the losses 
of the intermediaries established in the first period. The “real” news about 
the economy is that rents in period 2 were 25, not the hoped-for 100. But 
land bought for 200 will now yield only 25 in rents plus 50 in resale value, 
a loss of  125 rather than merely 75. The magnification effect is caused, of 
course, by the circular logic of disintermediation: The prospective end to 
intermediation, driven by  the losses of the existing institutions, reduces 
asset prices and therefore magnifies those losses. 
And now we come to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Suppose that 
in  fact intermediaries  have been lucky and that second-period rents do 50  Paul Krugman 
turn out to be 100. Now if everyone then expects that the government will 
continue to guarantee intermediaries in the future, the land price at the 
end of the second period will also be  100. In that case no bailout will be 
needed; and so the government guarantee for intermediation will in fact 
continue. 
But suppose, on the other hand, that despite the high rents in the second 
period potential creditors become convinced that there will be no guaran- 
tee on newly incurred liabilities of intermediaries. Then they will not be 
able to attract funds, and the price of land in the second period will be 
only 50. That means, however, that intermediaries that borrowed money 
in the first period based on Pangloss values, including the Pangloss value 
of 100 for land sales, will require a bailout-and  since the government’s 
willingness to provide for bailouts is now exhausted, investors’ pessimism 
is justified. 
In short, our stylized little model appears to generate a story about self- 
fulfilling financial crises, in which plunging asset prices undermine banks, 
and the collapse of the banks in turn ratifies the drop in asset prices. But 
it is not the only such story. 
2.3  Modeling the Crisis 11: Disintermediation and Liquidation 
Even as the conventional wisdom has appeared to crystallize around 
the view that moral hazard and the resulting asset price inflation created 
the preconditions for the Asian crisis, some observers have disagreed. Re- 
cently Radelet and Sachs (2000, 149) have argued that “the East Asian 
crisis resulfed from vulnerability to financial panic . . . ,  combined with a 
series of policy missteps and accidents that triggered the panic. Since we 
view the crisis as a case of multiple equilibria, our hypothesis is that the 
worst of the crisis could have been largely avoided with relatively moderate 
adjustments. . . I’ In effect, they argue that the precrisis asset values were 
more or less reasonable, and that it is the current deflated values that are 
an aberration-obviously  an important point for assessing fire-sale FDI. 
What kind of model could make sense of this view? The main contender 
is a “bank run” model along the lines of the classic paper by  Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983). Such models, like the moral hazard model, attribute 
crisis to the collapse of financial intermediaries. However, financial inter- 
mediaries are now seen as essentially benign institutions, which reconcile 
the need for long-term commitment of capital to projects without short- 
term payoffs with the desire of individual investors to be able to withdraw 
funds on demand. The problem with such intermediaries, according to the 
model, is that they are vulnerable to self-fulfilling  investor panics: If inves- 
tors believe that sufficiently many other investors will try to cash in early, 
they will follow suit-and  in so doing force destructive early liquidation 
of real investments. Fire-Sale FDI  51 
In this section  I offer a simplified exposition of  a Diamond-Dybvig 
model. It is a highly abstract example, substantially harder to map into 
real-world developments than the simple Pangloss-collapse model of the 
previous section, but it does give us at least a first pass at the alternative 
view. 
As in the crisis model above, we consider a three-period world. (Three 
periods is the minimum for financial crises, which must involve an initial 
investment and then something going wrong with expectations rather than 
or as well as actual earnings. While three-period models may seem arti- 
ficial-why  not an infinite horizon?-my  own experience, in which the 
infinite-horizon Krugman 1998b  actually preceded the finite-horizon Krug- 
man  1998a, suggests that for exploratory theorizing simplicity wins out 
over the marginal gain in realism.) In this case, however, there are real in- 
vestment opportunities of two kinds. Investors can put their wealth into a 
short-term asset-say,  dollar treasury bills-that  yields a known rate of re- 
turn r. Or they can back investment projects that yield a higher rate of re- 
turn, say T,  but that take two periods to mature. That is, one of these proj- 
ects takes one unit of initial capital and transforms it into (1 + T)~  units 
of output in period 3, where T > r. 
Crucially, we  assume that for some reason  it is not possible to sell a 
halfway-completed project to some other investor who will finish it. One 
can imagine a variety of reasons for this-perhaps  some kind of lemons 
problem-but  for the purposes of this model we simply take the nonmar- 
ketability as a given. Thus an investor who decides to liquidate a long- 
term asset in period 2 must actually scrap the real investment, realizing 
only a liquidation value v that we assume less than 1 + r. 
The need foifinancial intermediaries is created, following Diamond and 
Dybvig, by the need of individuals for liquidity. Each individual starts with 
one unit of capital but does not know when he will want to consume: Only 
after investing does he discover whether he wants to consume in period 2 
or in period  3. This creates a dilemma: An individual who invests in a 
long-term project, then discovers a need for short-term consumption, is 
stuck with only the liquidation value. On the other hand, an individual 
who invests in the safe asset, then discovers that his consumption will take 
place in period 3, has forgone an opportunity to achieve a higher standard 
of living. 
Figure  2.1 illustrates  the dilemma of  an individual  investor in  state 
space, with consumption in period  2 (if he turns out to be  a period-2 
consumer) on the horizontal axis, consumption in period  3 (if  he turns 
out to be a period-3 consumer) on the vertical. If he invests only in the 
short-term asset, he will have consumption of  1  + r if he turns out to be 
a period-2 consumer, (1 + r)’ (because he must then reinvest his capital in 
the short term) if he turns out to be a period-3 consumer. On the other 
hand, if he invests only in the long-term asset, he will receive only v if he 52  Paul Krugman 
V  1+ r  c2 
Fig. 2.1  The Diamond-Dybvig story 
must consume in period 2, but (1 + T)’  if he consumes in period 3. And 
he can, of course, choose any convex combination of the two. 
But now suppose that there is a financial intermediary that pools the 
capital of a large number of individuals, investing some in the short-term 
and some in the long-term asset. Ignoring for a moment the possibility of 
a bank run, such an intermediary can in effect exploit the law  of large 
numbers to allow each investor to withdraw money at will, while still hav- 
ing a predictable aggregate withdrawal in period 2. To  see the advantage 
of this, suppose that the intermediary were to allow each contributor of 
capital to withdraw  1 + r in period 2, and suppose that the intermediary 
knows that a fraction p  of the population  will turn out to be period-2 
consumers. Then all the intermediary needs to do is put a fractionp of the 
funds it receives into the short-term asset,  1 -  p into the long-term asset; 
then each investor will expect to receive 1 + r if he consumes in period 2, 
(1 +  IT)^ if he consumes in period 3-dominating  the range of possibilities 
available without  the intermediary.  In general,  of course,  investors will 
choose some other point on the budget constraint passing through that 
point, so that they will do even better. 
So far so good. But such an intermediary is, as Diamond and Dybvig 
pointed out, potentially subject to a bank run. In our case this possibility 
arises because the liquidation value v is less than the promised payout to 
early withdrawers. The point is straightforward. Suppose that for some 
reason-it  does not matter what that reason is-investors  who would or- 
dinarily  not have withdrawn  their funds become convinced  that  many 
other such investors will attempt to withdraw their funds. Should investors 
who plan to consume in period 3 nonetheless withdraw funds in period 2, 
the intermediary will not have enough of the safe asset and will therefore Fire-Sale FDI  53 
have to liquidate projects in midstream; and since the liquidation value is 
less than the promised payout, not all investors will in fact be able to with- 
draw their funds. The rumor of such a run will therefore lead to a rush 
to withdraw funds by investors anxious not to be last in line. (Of course, 
in principle the possibility of a run should be taken into account in the 
initial investments and offers by the intermediary; one can justify the ap- 
proach here by  supposing that such a run is perceived as a very unlikely 
event.) 
As in the previous model, this gives us a story about a crisis that can be 
sparked merely by self-fulfilling expectations. In the moral hazard model, 
however, the precrisis state of affairs is fundamentally  unsustainable;  in 
effect, the asset market is in a “metastable” state, like a sandpile with a “su- 
percritical” slope, and any small shock causes an avalanche-a  slump in 
asset values toward their appropriate level. In  the bank-run model,  the 
precrisis state is reasonable and capable of being sustained, but is under- 
mined by  an unnecessary  panic-which  produces  real costs due to the 
premature interruption of productive activities. 
Both views can be given some support from anecdotal evidence, as ar- 
gued below. But let us turn next to the implications of the two views for FDI. 
2.4  The Role of FDI 
As Kindleberger (1 969) pointed out long ago, FDI is essentially about 
transfer of control rather than movement of capital per se. Indeed, a quick 
look even at balance-of-payments measures of FDI for emerging market 
economies reveals that there is very little relationship between overall capi- 
tal flows and FDI. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show overall capital inflows and 
inward FDI for Mexico and Argentina from 1990 to 1996; even though 
such balance-of-payments numbers tend to confuse internal capital trans- 
fers within firms (which behave like portfolio capital) with true changes in 
40000 
30000 
c  20000 




0  .-  - 
te 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Year 





Fig. 2.3  Argentine capital inflows 
control, there is  still a striking lack of correlation-or  perhaps even an 
inverse correlation-between  overall capital inflow and FDI. 
Kindleberger’s discussion suggested that in order to think about FDI 
we must therefore not ask why capital might flow into a country, but rather 
why some particular asset would be worth more under foreign than under 
domestic control. This in turn could reflect either higher expected earnings 
under foreign control, or a lower foreign cost of capital and hence a higher 
valuation on given earnings. The interesting point is that this dichotomy 
between two possible reasons for foreign ownership neatly matches our 
two different stories about financial crisis. 
Consider first the moral hazard view. The only reason for foreign owner- 
ship, in a pure model of that sort, would be that foreign firms could man- 
age the akets better  than domestic rivals, and therefore extract higher 
rents. Suppose, for example, that under foreign owners a given piece of 
land would yield 20 percent more than under domestic management. Then 
land would yield 120 in the good state, 30 in the bad, for an expected value 
of 60. Absent moral hazard, foreigners would outbid domestic investors 
for the physical assets. 
But if domestic firms can borrow with implicit guarantees, they will be 
willing to pay higher prices than foreign owners despite their lower ex- 
pected returns. As a result, foreign firms will be crowded out of the domes- 
tic market. (In terms of the balance of payments, this might well mean that 
domestic firms raise capital directly or indirectly by  borrowing abroad.) 
The fire-sale FDI story is now clear. Suppose that in period 2 there is a 
collapse of the Pangloss regime, either because of actual bad news or be- 
cause of self-fulfilling expectations. Then the prices that domestic firms 
are willing to pay for assets will drop-in  our case from 100 to 50-while 
foreign firms will still be willing to pay 60. So the result will be a transfer 
of ownership to the more efficient foreign firms. In a pure moral hazard 
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and the transfer of ownership is an efficient move from the world’s point 
of view: Assets are being placed under the control of those who can use 
them best. 
If we  take a financial panic point of view, matters look quite different. 
Suppose that foreign firms, unlike domestic investors during a panic, are 
not liquidity constrained; they can borrow and lend at the safe rate  r 
throughout. But they are less efficient at running domestic investment pro- 
jects than domestic firms (which must be  the case here, otherwise they 
would have made the investments in the first place). In the absence of a 
crisis the foreign firms will not get involved. But once there is a crisis, any 
foreign firm that can take over a project in midstream and do sufficiently 
well to earn a final return greater than v(1 + r)-that  is, any firm that is 
not liquidity constrained and can earn more than the liquidation value by 
keeping the project in existence-will  be in a position to buy the project 
from the crisis-stricken domestic intermediary. In this case there will truly 
be  a fire sale. And such fire sales will  typically transfer ownership to a 
foreign firm that is  less efficient than the domestic firm but that is now 
able to outbid domestic residents because of its superior cash position. 
Thus our two alternative crisis stories seem to have opposite implica- 
tions for the efficiency consequences of fire-sale FDI. If the drop in asset 
values really reflects the collapse of a moral-hazard-driven bubble, the re- 
allocation of control is putting assets into the “right” hands; if  it reflects 
an essentially arbitrary run on domestic intermediaries, it puts assets into 
the “wrong” hands. 
Before we make too much of this distinction, however, we  should notice 
that in either cFse the presence of foreign buyers will limit the actual fall 
in asset prices. In the moral hazard case, land falls from 100 to 60, not 50, 
which means that the losses to domestic investors (and taxpayers) are less 
than they would have been if  foreign acquisitions had been blocked. In 
the financial panic case, the willingness of foreign investors to buy half- 
completed projects means that the costs of liquidation are avoided, which 
is necessarily a gain that more than offsets the loss from the transfer into 
less efficient hands. 
Finally, we should note a final point: The availability of potential foreign 
buyers may in itself be a stabilizing factor. Suppose that we take the pure 
financial panic model, but add a large number of potential foreign buyers 
who could complete a project with a return of at least d(l + r)-that  is, 
who would be willing to pay a price high enough to pay off all investors, 
even if  everyone decided to withdraw funds early. In that case investors, 
knowing that they had nothing to lose by failing to join in a run on the 
intermediary, would not in fact withdraw their funds unless they needed 
to consume in period 2, which means that the possibility of a bank run 
would be eliminated. Or to put it a bit differently, the presence of potential 
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impossible. This suggests an unconventional additional payoff to opening 
one’s economy to foreign direct investment: Quite aside from any transfers 
of technology, managerial skills and so on, the mere potential for FDI 
may act as a stabilizer against the risk of domestic financial panics. 
In any case, our analysis of both models seems to indicate that whether 
or not foreign investors are getting bargains-whether  asset prices have 
fallen because they were initially overpriced or because they are now un- 
derpriced-given  that a crisis has occurred, the “fire sale” of domestic 
companies is currently in the interest of the afflicted countries. It remains 
interesting, however, to ask which of these stories we believe to be closer 
to the truth. 
2.5  What Kind of Fire Sale? 
As long as we  view the Asian crisis as a matter of collapsing financial 
intermediaries, it is easy to explain why that crisis should be accompanied 
by the sale of domestic assets to foreign firms. However, we have also seen 
that the efficiency implications of those sales-whether  assets are being 
sold into or out of the “right” hands-depends  on whether asset values 
are slumping toward or away from their appropriate levels. 
What evidence do we have on the nature of the crisis? It seems hard to 
deny that there was a very significant moral hazard issue on the eve of 
the crisis. The role of “finance companies” in Thailand fits the “minister’s 
nephew” story almost perfectly; in Indonesia many dubious investments 
(including the ambitious plans of a taxi company, which caused the spec- 
tacular failure of Hong Kong’s Peregrine) involved members of the presi- 
dent’s family. In South Korea, all accounts suggest that the chaebol were 
engaged in reckless, ill-conceived expansion plans-with  the industrial 
groups moving into businesses far from their core competencies, and in 
many cases overseas ventures that seemed foolhardy even at the time- 
that would surely have come to grief even without the speculative attack. 
Indeed, a series of chaebol bankruptcies took place even before the onset 
of speculation against the currency. 
To some extent the “overborrowing syndrome” (as McKinnon and Pill 
[1996] call it) shows up in balance of payments statistics. Figure 2.4 shows 
total capital flows into South Korea, inward direct investment, and out- 
ward direct investment. The striking points are both the very low level of 
inward investment given the size of overall inflow and the remarkable posi- 
tion of Korea as a net direct investor abroad. Whatever the strengths of 
Korean management, this seems a peculiar position for a middle-income 
country; a parsimonious explanation of the pattern is that moral-hazard- 
driven lending allowed Korean firms both to crowd out potential inward 







1  6 
FDI in 
Year 
Fig. 2.4  Korean capital flows 
And yet while asset prices were surely overheated on the eve of the crisis, 
it is also easy to make the case that  the crisis itself has overshot. The 
market values of Asian firms do seem extraordinarily low, even given their 
debt burdens. Moreover, while much of the real slump in Asia may be due 
to demand-side effects of plunging asset values and to the effects of the 
high interest rates being used to defend currencies against hyperdeval- 
uation, there is also considerable anecdotal evidence of a supply-side dis- 
ruption of activity due to a breakdown of the credit system; this may be 
viewed as a version of the liquidation costs in our financial panic model. 
So, does the foreign purchase of Asian assets represent the transfer of 
control to efficient owners who were previously unable to buy at a reason- 
able price? Or does it represent sales to inefficient owners who happen to 
have cash? Alas, probably some of  both. What we  need-surprise-is 
more research. Luckily, the issue of fire-sale FDI is not likely to go away 
anytime soon; even if the Asian crisis eases, its legacy of foreign ownership 
will be contentious for years to come. 
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Comment  Aaron Tornell 
Krugman’s paper concerns the sale of domestic assets in the aftermath of 
the Asian crisis. He states that there has been a wave of such sales to for- 
eigners and at much lower prices than in preceding months. Does this con- 
stitute a fire sale of productive assets to foreigners that will use them less 
efficiently? Or does it actually constitute a productivity-enhancing trans- 
action? 
The answer depends on one’s view  regarding the lending mechanism 
underlying the Asian crisis. If domestic entrepreneurs are more efficient at 
running such projects, and the crisis simply reflected a run  against the 
country, then the obvious conclusion is that the forced sale of  assets to 
foreigners is inefficient. On the other hand, if domestic agents had access 
to cheap credit, the creditors did not monitor the quality of the investment 
projects, and the domestic agents invested in socially inefficient projects, 
then the sale of assets to foreigners is a good thing. 
Krugman connects these two views to alternative crises models. In one 
model, there are implicit government bailout guarantees and a group of 
privileged agents that can borrow at the riskless interest rate and invest in 
very risky projects with low expected returns. As a result, a lending boom 
accompanied by asset price inflation develops. Once the future arrives and 
the country defaults on its debt, asset prices collapse and foreigners are 
able to acquire the assets at fair prices and (maybe) use them more effi- 
ciently. 
The second view  is  connected with the celebrated Diamond-Dybvig 
model of bank runs. In this model the crisis is caused by  liquidity prob- 
lems, not by insolvency. As a result, domestic residents are forced to liqui- 
date their assets at an unfairly low price. 
The question then becomes which view is empirically correct? Was the 
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crisis a result of a significant amount of inefficient projects that made the 
economies unable to repay, or was it simply the result of a run? More work 
would be helpful in this area. 
Finally, I would like to note that the fact that asset prices collapsed is 
consistent with a lending boom explanation in a world where collateral is 
an important determinant of  lending, and where future asset prices are 
themselves determinants of the value of collateral. Thus a more detailed 
analysis of the ex  ante characteristics of  the investment projects in the 
precrisis years would be very useful in identifying the true causes of the 
crisis. This Page Intentionally Left Blank